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Effort Provision and Communication in Teams Competing over the Commons 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Schott et al. (2007) have shown that the “tragedy of the commons” can be overcome 
when individuals share their output equally in groups of optimal size and there is no 
communication. In this paper we investigate the impact of introducing communication 
groups that may or may not be linked to output sharing groups. Communication reduces 
shirking, increases aggregate effort and reduces aggregate rents, but only when 
communication groups and output-sharing groups are linked. The effect is stronger for 
fixed groups (partners treatment) than for randomly reassigned groups (strangers 
treatment). Performance is not distinguishable from the no-communication treatments 
when communication is permitted but subjects share output within groups different from 
the groups within which they communicate. Communication also tends to enhance the 
negative effect of the partnered group assignment on the equality of individual payoffs. 
We use detailed content analysis to evaluate the impact of communication messages on 
behavior across treatments.  
 
 
 
Keywords: Common pool resources, communication, coordination, cooperation, free-
riding, behavior in teams, partners and strangers, experiments 
 
JEL classification codes: Q20, C92, C72
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Economic decisions are frequently made by groups of individuals who are competing 
with other groups of individuals. These may be firms competing with other firms to sell a 
product in a market or to extract a resource from a common pool, or they may be teams 
of workers competing with other teams of workers within a firm. Typically, the success 
of a firm or a team is dependent upon the effort expended by the members of the firm or 
team. These environments are particularly interesting because of the interplay of 
conflicting incentives that may exist within and between groups. The conflict between 
groups may lead to an inefficient allocation of resources. In a tournament all competitors 
exert effort, but only one may win the tournament and receive the reward. The effort 
expended by losing competitors goes unrewarded. When extracting resources from a 
common pool, such as a fishery, competitors impose congestion costs on one another. 
The effort expended will typically exceed the efficient level of effort necessary to 
generate the resulting extraction level. When the competing groups are made up of self-
interested individuals, further conflicts may arise. For example agents exploiting a 
common pool resource (CPR) can be placed in a number of output-sharing partnerships 
as proposed by Schott [18]. Members of each partnership pool their harvest and share it 
equally. This introduces an incentive for agents to free-ride on their partners by reducing 
their own work effort. This shirking reduces overall effort and offsets the over-harvesting 
incentive caused by the between-group conflict.  
Schott et al. [19] study the exploitation of CPRs with output-sharing partnerships in a 
laboratory setting. Partnership sizes are varied among single resource users (no output 
sharing), a socially optimal partnership size and a larger than optimal partnership size. 
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They find that sharing output in partnerships significantly reduces resource-extraction 
effort. They also find that when the theoretically optimal group size is established, the 
groups in fact allocate the optimal amount of effort to appropriation. Heintzelman et al. 
[10] study formally the endogenous formation and stability of output-sharing groups and 
determine the conditions under which output sharing in optimal partnerships becomes a 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in a two-stage game. 
A complication may arise however if members of the teams can coordinate their 
actions. For example, coordination amongst team members can eliminate the shirking 
incentive while leaving the original between-group conflict unabated. Communication 
among members of a group is likely an important factor influencing coordination. 
Previous experimental studies with unitary agents (not teams) have shown that 
communication in the form of non-binding cheap talk improves cooperation in common-
pool resource and voluntary public good games and can overcome the “tragedy of the 
commons” or free-riding behavior in the provision of public goods [5,9,11,12,13,16]. 
These studies suggest that the decentralized governance of CPRs and public goods is 
possible as long as agents are able to communicate with each other on a regular basis. 
They do not address the problem of inter-group conflict, however. 
Studies of inter-group conflict versus individual competition have been recently 
reported for environments with contests for a fixed-value prize [1,2,7] or for the output 
from a common pool resource [8].  All show that communication within groups affects 
the outcome of the inter-group game.  Abbink et al. [1] study single individuals or groups 
of four individuals competing with a single individual or with another group of four 
individuals for a prize of fixed value. They report that inter-group competition results in 
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more rent-seeking than individual competition. When there can be intra-group 
punishment, even more resources are wasted. Ahn et al. [2] study single individuals or 
five-person groups competing with either a single individual or with a five-person group 
for a fixed-value prize. The competitor who bids the most wins the prize. If the five-
person group wins, each member receives an equal share of the prize. Ahn et al. (Result 
2) found that “individuals show decreased contribution levels when in groups of five 
rather than when playing as individuals.” This result contrasts with Abbink et al. [1] and 
suggests that in tournaments between teams, rent seeking will fall (but still be greater 
than the Nash equilibrium prediction). Davis and Reilly [7] study rent-defending groups 
(with 1, 2 or 5 members) competing against four potential monopolists. The introduction 
of rent-defending groups increases rent-seeking. However, using the summary data from 
the last 15 of 30 decision rounds, they find that increasing the size of the defending group 
from one to five members decreases rent seeking by 20 percent. Overall, rent seeking 
exceeds the predicted Nash equilibrium levels of rent seeking, but this effect is smaller in 
larger groups.  Gillet et al. [8] study decisions made by groups of appropriators from a 
common pool.  Decisions of groups are made according to a unanimity rule or majority 
rule. Their environment differs from standard common pool resource environments by 
introducing a dynamic resource stock. They report that common pool resource extraction 
determined by a group of appropriators is less myopic, but more competitive, than is 
extraction by individual appropriators. When decision makers are groups of individuals, 
there is more rent seeking than when decision makers are individuals. 
A few studies have examined the effect of communication in inter-group games. 
Rapoport and Bornstein [17], Schram and Sonnemans [20] and Zhang [22] study a step-
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level public good game played by two groups with the threshold determined by the 
contribution level of the opponent group. They report a significant increase in group 
contributions when within-group communication is allowed. Sutter and Strassmair [21] 
evaluate within-group and between-group conflict with and without communication in a 
tournament that involves two teams that compete for a fixed prize which the losing team 
pays and the winning team shares equally. They find that free-riding dominates when 
teams cannot communicate or can only communicate with members from other teams. 
Communication within teams, on the other hand, enables teams to coordinate actions and 
overcome the free-rider problem. The latter may be in the interest of principals or 
employers but not in the collective interest of team members because they supply 
excessive levels of effort in order to win the prize. 
Coordination induced by communication within output-sharing partnerships is a 
potential threat to the viability of output-sharing as a management strategy for many 
CPRs such as fisheries. In a classic fishery dominated by many small fishermen from 
geographically dispersed villages it would seem natural to form output-sharing teams 
publicly within each community. Under such circumstances communication within local 
teams would seem normal, but as we have seen such communication might lead back to 
the over-harvesting that output-sharing was intended to cure. For this reason the impact 
of communication on effort and output when communication is confined to subgroups of 
players needs to be examined in detail. To our knowledge there are no laboratory studies 
which have addressed these issues in the context of CPRs.  
One important aspect of intra-group communication in competition among teams is 
the composition and longevity of communication and output-sharing groups. These do 
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not need to be identical. For example communication in a fishery might take place within 
local communities while output-sharing was implemented anonymously over a greater 
territory, so that team members might be from different communities and might not know 
each other. A further complication arises if teams are remixed regularly so as to prevent 
agreements and understandings building up over time. Sufficient anonymity and remixing 
might eliminate the coordination-enhancing effects of communication.  
A second intriguing aspect is the mechanism of communication itself. Exactly how 
does communication within groups lead to coordination? Investigating such questions 
requires a protocol for recording and coding messages. One method is to restrict 
communication to computer-mediated chat rooms and to apply the methodology of 
content analysis to the transcript in the manner of Zhang [22]. We adopt this method for 
the present study.  
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the effect of communication on effort 
supply in different output-sharing partnership environments and to investigate the 
relationship between the provision of effort and the type and volume of messages. We 
design a CPR game with equal output-sharing in partnerships that allows us to analyze 
within and between group conflicts and to evaluate deviations from the socially efficient 
outcome. We derive hypotheses based on theoretical insights and empirical evidence 
from past experimental studies for a variety of different communication group and 
output-sharing group arrangements. We then evaluate individual and group behavior in a 
controlled laboratory experiment with online communication in chat rooms. We contrast 
our results to no-communication treatments with partners and strangers and other related 
empirical results in the literature. Finally we analyze the frequency and content of 
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messages in the different communication treatments and offer insight into how message 
content and frequency are related to differences in behavior. 
We examine three treatments. The first reflects the case of a number of communities, 
businesses or social groups that communicate and share output equally among 
themselves, but compete for the yield from the CPR with other communities or groups. 
This treatment modifies the “partners” treatment presented in Schott et al. [19] by 
allowing the output-sharing partners to communicate within their group every period. It is 
comparable to Sutter‟s and Strassmair‟s [21] communication within-teams treatment in a 
tournament setting, but is evaluated here with respect to individual, group and social 
efficiency criteria. Our second treatment is a “strangers” treatment with communication.  
Group members communicate with each other and then share output equally, but are 
randomly allocated to new groups at the start of each round. This treatment reflects 
centralized allocation to randomized output-sharing groups and would be applicable if the 
central manager permitted anonymous communication among group members. It allows 
us to investigate intra-group communication in a one-shot stranger setting and too see 
whether the strong cooperation within groups and the high effort levels observed by 
Sutter and Strassmair [21] continue if groups are reassembled each period. Our third and 
final treatment holds communication groups constant but remixes output-sharing groups 
each period.  This reflects a world in which members of a single community or team 
regularly communicate with each other, but share output randomly with others not 
necessarily from their community or team. This scenario, in which communication 
groups and output-sharing groups are not linked, is a potentially important middle ground 
if linked output-sharing groups are able to avoid free-riding on each other, thereby 
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circumventing the efficiency-enhancing attributes of output-sharing in partnerships 
without communication. Allowing for fixed group communication alongside anonymous 
randomized output-sharing group formation might also be a useful mechanism for 
managers who realize that their teams are over-supplying effort and wish to avoid direct 
coordination and to reduce excessive competition among competing teams.  
 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
Each session involves 12 participants divided into three output-sharing groups of four 
participants each. Each decision period every participant is required to allocate a fixed 
endowment of effort, „e‟, between a private activity which provides a known return of „r‟ 
per unit of effort and a resource extraction activity which provides a varying return that 
depends upon the aggregate effort of all 12 participants.  In the interest of brevity the 
term “effort” will henceforth refer only to the effort devoted to resource extraction, unless 
another interpretation is clearly required by the context.  
The total output and return (price is normalized to one) from the common-pool 
resource is given by 

Y = 32.5X - 0.09375X 2,       (1) 
where Y  is total output appropriated from the CPR and X  is the sum of the resource-
extraction effort of all participants.
1
  Output is distributed to output-sharing groups in 
                                                          
1
 The experiment is conducted with neutral framing.  Effort is referred to as “Investment” and the two 
activities are termed Market One and Market Two. 
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proportion to their group effort, gX , and this output is distributed equally to all group 
members. Thus the individual profit function under output-sharing is 

 i = r(e - xi) +
1
4
Xg
X
Y
.
       (2) 
We test five treatments. In two of them, Treatments R and F, no communication among 
participants is permitted. In Treatment R output-sharing groups are randomized each 
period. In Treatment F output-sharing groups remain fixed. In the remaining treatments 
communication is allowed at the beginning of each decision period. In all communication 
treatments participants are assigned to one of three communication groups of four 
persons each. The communication group may or may not be the same as the output-
sharing group. We refer to these as “linked” and “not linked” treatments, respectively. 
The output-sharing group may be fixed across periods or randomized at the beginning of 
each period. Thus we have three communication treatments: a fixed-fixed-linked (FFL) 
specification in which communication and output-sharing groups are both linked and 
fixed across periods, a random-random-linked specification (RRL) in which 
communication and output-sharing groups are linked but randomized each period, and a 
fixed-random-not-linked (FRNL) specification in which communication groups remain 
fixed but output sharing groups are scrambled every period and no longer linked to the 
communication group.
2
  Table 1 summarizes the five treatments in this experiment.  
                                                          
2
 
Five possible combinations of our treatment factors are not tested in this paper.  Linking fixed and random 
production groups and communication groups is not possible (FRL and RFL) and the remaining three 
(RFNL, FFNL and RRNL) were judged to be implausible in the context of CPR management.  
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Communication is introduced by way of a chat window that appears on the computer 
screens of the participants.
3
  Prior to the first decision round, individuals are given four 
minutes to send messages to other members in their communication group.  No private 
messages are allowed.  After the four-minute communication period, individuals make 
private and anonymous decisions about the number of units of effort they will allocate to 
appropriation from the common pool.  The remaining units of effort are automatically 
allocated to the private activity. Subjects then share their output from the common pool 
amongst all output-sharing group members and are given a summary providing their 
earnings for the period, the average earnings of others in their group and the average 
earnings of others outside of their group. Prior to the second and third decision rounds, 
individuals are given three minutes to communicate. Prior to the fourth round this is set at 
two minutes and from the fifth through the fifteenth rounds, communication is limited to 
one minute. Communication is non-binding. Individuals are not required to adhere to any 
agreement they may have reached during the communication period by way of the chat 
window.
4
 
We analyze group and individual effort, relative rents and dispersion of payoffs by 
treatment.  We also code and analyze the content of the chat messages, and evaluate how 
each type of message might influence individual effort. 
 
                                                          
3
 
Bochet et al. [3] compare different forms of communication in public goods laboratory experiments and 
find little difference between the effects of face-to-face communication and verbal communication through 
a chat room. 
4
 Groups used up to 234 seconds, 178 seconds, 177 seconds and 118 seconds respectively in the first four 
periods and less than 60 seconds in the following periods.  Thus there was no evidence that decisions were 
forced because of time pressure in our experiment. 
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2.1. Treatments R and F 
Our parameterization is the same as that used by Schott et al. [19]. Each participant is 
endowed with 28 units of effort to allocate to appropriation from the common pool 
resource or to an activity which pays a return of 3.25 lab dollars for each unit of effort. 
For this parameterization a group size of four is optimal in that the Nash equilibrium for 
three equal-sized groups of four coincides with the surplus-maximizing allocation of 
effort. There is no unique equilibrium allocation of effort for any member of a group, but 
there is a unique group Nash equilibrium allocation of 52 units of effort to appropriation 
from the common pool (equilibrium system effort is 156).
5
 
Treatments R and F differ in how participants are assigned to output-sharing groups. 
Although theory offers no prediction on the effect of group assignment, Schott et al. [19] 
report that the dispersion of cumulative earnings for the individual participants is 
significantly reduced in random group assignment compared to fixed group assignment. 
One possible explanation they provide is that individual players are more likely to 
manipulate others‟ future choices in a fixed group assignment because they can best 
respond to other players accounting for the efforts from previous periods. These results 
might change when within-group communication is introduced. 
 
2.2. Treatments RRL, FFL and FRNL 
                                                          
5
 See section 1 of Appendix I for a derivation of the equilibrium results. See Schott et al. [19] for the 
derivation of the optimal effort to allocate to appropriation from the common pool. 
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The parameters underlying Treatments RRL, FFL and FRNL are identical to those for 
Treatments R and F. Communication is non-binding, so the stage-game Nash equilibrium 
is unchanged. We note, however, that communication typically helps individuals in 
groups to coordinate their efforts, overcoming the tendency to shirk in public good 
environments and helping them to reduce excess effort in simple CPR environments 
[14,16]. When output sharing is used as a management instrument in a common-pool 
resource environment without communication, it succeeds because individuals shirk on 
others‟ effort to appropriate on behalf of the group. Introducing communication may 
break down this shirking behavior as members of the group have the means to co-
ordinate their actions while competing against other groups to obtain a larger share of the 
system output. 
In the extreme case of perfect group co-ordination the individual group optimization 
of profit can be found by aggregating equation (2) across the four members of the group 
and differentiating it with respect to group output. In this case, the unique Nash 
equilibrium effort for each group is 78. There is no unique Nash equilibrium level of 
individual effort. Note that when the output-sharing groups compete against each other as 
groups, aggregate system effort is predicted to rise from the optimal level of 156 to 234.
6
 
 
3. EXPECTATIONS REGARDING EFFORT 
3.1. Treatments R and F 
                                                          
6
 
See section 2 of Appendix I for this derivation.  
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Given the parameterization of the common-pool resource environment introduced in 
Section 2, we expect that each of the three four-person output-sharing groups will supply 
52 units of effort. The system effort will be 156 units. This is true for both Treatments R 
and F.  
 
3.2. Treatments RRL, FFL and FRNL 
If communication groups and output-sharing groups are linked (Treatment RRL and 
FFL) the effect of output sharing may diminish. This will occur if individual players act 
co-operatively to increase group payoff. This suggests that under Treatments RRL and 
FFL group effort will be greater than the optimal level of 52 units and may approach 78 
units. However, it may take longer to reach 78 units for Treatment RRL than if the 
output-sharing and linked communication groups had fixed membership throughout the 
session, because group members in the RRL treatment receive different feedback every 
round from new group members and, therefore, will find it more difficult to form 
consistent expectations about the coordination of effort among group members. 
On the other hand, it will be difficult for individuals to coordinate on a specific group 
strategy when communication groups and output-sharing groups are not linked 
(Treatment FRNL). This difficulty arises because individuals will not know into which 
output-sharing group their communication group members are placed. However, 
comparing the FRNL treatment with the F or R treatments, participants may be better 
able to deduce and agree on achieving the symmetric Nash equilibrium outcome in which 
everyone allocates the optimal level of 13 units of effort to appropriation to maximize the 
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system output, which would achieve the most efficient (

1312156) and equitable 
solution. This is not a unique Nash equilibrium allocation for the individuals, but the 
focus on the symmetric Nash equilibrium is reasonable given that communication groups 
are not linked to constantly randomized output-sharing groups. Treatment FRNL may be 
more likely to induce shirking compared to the other communication treatments because 
participants will have a weaker incentive to focus on group output maximization than on 
system output maximization. 
The following expectations result from the discussion above: 
 Expectation 1: Effort will not differ between Treatments R and F. 
 Expectation 2: Effort will be greater in Treatments FFL and RRL than in 
Treatments F and R. 
 Expectation 3: Effort will be the same in Treatments FRNL as in Treatments F 
and R. 
 Expectation 4: Effort will be greater in Treatment FFL than in Treatment RRL 
during early periods of a session. 
 Expectation 5: The difference in effort under Treatment RRL and Treatment FFL 
will tend to narrow over time. 
 
4. RESULTS 
A total of 240 subjects participated in the experiment. There were four sessions in each of 
the five treatments. In each session, three groups of four subjects participated in 15 
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decision rounds after three practice rounds. Laboratory currency was converted at the 
exchange rate of 200 Lab dollars for 1 Canadian dollar. On average, subjects earned $25 
each (the standard deviation was $2 and earnings ranged from $17.70 to $30.30 including 
a $5 show-up fee). Sessions were completed within 60 minutes in treatments without 
communication and within 90 minutes in treatments with communication. 
Table 2 summarizes mean system effort. There is one observation in each session. 
Table 2 also provides numerical predictions based on the expectations discussion in 
Section 3 above. A Kruskal-Wallis test indicates that there is a statistically significant 
difference among the 5 treatments (p-value = 0.0073 for mean system effort).
7
 
 
4.1. Aggregate effort 
For Treatments F and R, the Nash equilibrium for players maximizing individual 
payoffs predicts system effort of 156 units and individual session payoff of L$4217. The 
actual system efforts in both treatments are not significantly different from the 
predictions (sign test, two-sided, n = 4, p-value = 0.625 for mean system effort in both 
treatments). There is also no significant difference between Treatments F and R (Mann-
Whitney U test, p-value = 1, n = m = 4).  
Result 1.  When there is no communication, the mean system appropriation effort is 
consistent with the equilibrium prediction of individual optimization. 
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All non-parametric tests reported in this paper take each session as an independent observation. Test 
results from an OLS regression using robust standard errors are consistent with all non-parametric tests 
reported. The regression is of the form syseffort = a + bR + cFRNL + dRRL + eFFL, where the dependent 
variable is mean system effort per session, R, FRNL, RRL, FFL are treatment dummies, and “a” captures 
the value of the mean system effort in the F treatment. 
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Group assignment (fixed versus random) makes no difference. These are 
identical to the results documented in Schott et al. [19].
8
 This evidence 
supports Expectation 1. 
When pre-play non-binding communication is allowed (under Treatments FFL, RRL 
and FRNL), system effort differs significantly from that of the no-communication 
treatments (Mann-Whitney U test, p-value = 0.0026, n = 8, m = 12). There is a significant 
increase in aggregate effort in Treatment RRL relative to Treatment R (Mann-Whitney U 
test, p-value = 0.0433, n = m = 4) and an even larger significant increase in Treatment 
FFL relative to Treatment F (Mann-Whitney U test, p-value = 0.0209, n = m = 4). While 
the median system effort in FFL is not significantly different than 234 units, the median 
system effort in RRL falls between the predicted value of 156 units with individual 
optimization (which is achieved in R) and the predicted value of 234 units with group 
optimization.
9
 
Result 2.  When subjects are communicating with and sharing output with the same 
people each round, there is a significant increase in mean system effort in 
random output-sharing groups (Treatment RRL vs. R) and an even larger 
increase in fixed output-sharing groups (Treatment FFL vs. F), where 
group effort is at the predicted group-optimization level. Compared to 
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We used data from Schott et al. [19] for 3 of our 4 sessions for Treatments F and R. We have added an 
additional replication of F and R treatments for this paper that were not reported in Schott et al. [19] in 
order to increase accuracy and provide symmetry to the three communication treatment sessions.  Results 
from the new replications confirm the robustness of results reported by Schott et al. [19]. 
9
 
The null hypothesis that the median system effort in FFL is equal to the predicted value of 234 units 
cannot be rejected (sign test, two-sided, p-value = 0.6250, n = 4). However, the null hypothesis that the 
median system effort in RRL is equal to the predicted value of 234 can be rejected in favor of the 
alternative that it is less than 234 (sign test, one-sided, p-value = 0.0625, n=4). The null hypothesis that the 
median system effort in RRL is equal to 156 can be rejected in favor of the alternative that it is more than 
156 (sign test, one-sided, p-value = 0.0625, n=4). 
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random linked group assignment (Treatment RRL), fixed linked group 
assignment (Treatment FFL) leads to better coordination and thus 
significantly more appropriation effort. This evidence supports 
Expectation 2.   
While communicating groups linked to output-sharing groups are better able to 
coordinate than groups who may not communicate, this is not true when stable 
communication groups share output with a different group each round  (Treatment 
FRNL). When communication and output-sharing groups are not linked, appropriators 
coordinated no better than in the no communication treatments. System effort for 
Treatment FRNL is not significantly different from the predicted individual-optimization 
level of 156 units (sign test, two-sided, p-value = 0.6250), nor from the actual system 
effort from Treatment R (Mann-Whitney U test, p-value = 0.3865, n = m = 4), nor from 
the actual system effort from Treatment F (Mann-Whitney U test, p-value = 0.1489, n = 
m = 4). 
Result 3.  When communication and output-sharing groups are not linked, 
communication is not able to effectively facilitate coordination among 
group members. Effort devoted toward appropriation is not increased over 
that in the no-communication, output-sharing treatments. This evidence 
supports Expectation 3.  
The data support our expectation that communication within output-sharing groups 
will increase system effort.  This suggests that communication among group members is 
counteracting the free-riding incentives provided by output sharing.  Moreover, the offset 
effect is much larger when appropriators are communicating and sharing output with the 
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same group of participants each decision round (comparing FFL with RRL, Mann-
Whitney U test, p-value = 0.0209, n = m = 4). Intuitively, it is more difficult for 
appropriators to enter into tacit or explicit agreement regarding appropriation when they 
are randomly assigned to groups in each decision round. Expectations 4 and 5 imply that 
we should find positive differences between mean effort in FFL and mean effort in RRL 
early in the sessions and that over time, these differences will narrow. This pattern of 
behavior will be consistent with the FFL-RRL effort differences being positive and 
falling over time, but never becoming negative. Convergence of FFL and RRL effort is 
possible if with enough experience, linked groups, even if randomly assigned period after 
period, eventually behave in the same way. We can capture this behavior by fitting the 
function y = a + b(1/t), where y is the difference between mean effort in the four sessions 
of Treatment FFL on the one hand and the four sessions of Treatment RRL on the other.  
We expect that a= 0 and b > 0. When t = 1, b is the initial positive gap between FFL and 
RRL effort and as t gets larger and larger, b(1/t) goes to zero and the effort gap goes to 
zero.  Figure 2 presents the differences between the mean effort levels shown in Figure 1 
for Treatments FFL and RRL and includes an estimated trend line based on the 
relationship y = a + b(1/t). We can reject the null hypothesis that a = 0 in favor of the 
alternative that a ≠ 0 but we cannot reject the null hypothesis that b = 0 in favor of the 
alternative that b > 0. 
10
 
Result 4.  Group assignment has a significant impact on appropriation effort when 
output-sharing and communication are linked. Members of fixed output-
                                                          
10
 The results of an OLS regression give a = 53.88 with a standard error of 6.89 and b = -56.62 with a 
standard error of 21.22. The null hypothesis that a = 0 can be rejected in favor of the alternative that a ≠ 0 
(p = 0.000). The null hypothesis that b = 0 can not be rejected in favor of the alternative that b > 0 (p = 
0.980).     
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sharing groups coordinate much more effectively than do members of 
random output-sharing groups. This result persists through the 15 rounds 
of the laboratory sessions. This evidence supports Expectation 4 but does 
not support Expectation 5.  
4.2. Payoffs to participants in the CPR 
The impact of output sharing on the returns to the participants is also important to 
evaluate as adverse equity considerations or reduced incomes are likely to hinder the 
approval of a regulatory mechanism even if it is economically efficient. We adopt the 
coefficient of variation of individual payoffs (CoV) as our indicator of equity and income 
at the socially efficient level as a benchmark for income comparisons. With output 
sharing in groups of four and the socially efficient effort of 52 units per group, the mean 
individual payoff is 281.49 lab dollars per period or 4222 for the entire session of 15 
periods.  
Table 3 reports the means and CoVs of individual payoffs. There is one observation 
per session.  An OLS regression with robust standard errors indicates significant 
differences between the mean CoVs across treatments. The smallest CoV is observed in 
Treatment FRNL while the biggest is in FFL (Table 4).
11
  Pairwise comparisons of the 
mean CoVs between treatments indicate significant differences between all paired 
treatments except Treatments RRL and R. With linked communication groups the 
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The mean CoV in Treatment FRNL is significantly different from Treatment F, R, FFL and RRL (t test, 
p-value = 0.0002, 0.0114, 0.0002 and 0.0001 respectively). There is significant difference between 
Treatments F and R (t test, p-value = 0.0091) and also significant difference between Treatments FFL and 
RRL (t test, p-value = 0.0000). Treatment FFL is significantly different from Treatment F (t test, p-value = 
0.0000) while the difference between RRL and R is not significant (t test, p-value = 0.1480). Treatment R 
is significantly different from Treatment FFL (t test, p-value = 0.0000) and Treatment F is significantly 
different from Treatment RRL (t test, p-value = 0.0402). 
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distribution of payoffs for fixed output-sharing groups is less equitable than that of the 
random output-sharing groups, just as in the no-communication treatments. In addition, 
the payoffs for participants in the former treatments are less than those in the latter. 
However, when communication groups are fixed and output-sharing groups are randomly 
matched and no longer linked with communication groups (FRNL), payoffs are most 
equitably distributed among the five treatments and payoffs are significantly greater than 
those realized by participants in all other communication treatments. This equity in 
payoffs is consistent with our earlier conjecture that the FRNL treatment would provide 
an incentive for communication groups to discuss playing the symmetric socially optimal 
individual contribution of effort (

xi 13). This also supports the conjecture in Schott et al. 
[19] that random output-sharing groups would likely be more desirable than fixed output-
sharing groups in an environment involving communication. Furthermore, 
communication that is not linked to output-sharing has the positive effect of reducing 
income inequality. Because FRNL is not significantly different from R and F in terms of 
efficiency, communication in social groups and random output-sharing outside of social 
networks might be the most desirable output-sharing environment.  
Nonparametric tests on mean individual session payoffs, whose distributions are 
presented in Figure 3, indicate similar results. Taking one observation in each session, 
there is no significant difference in the mean individual session payoffs between 
Treatments F and R (Mann-Whitney test, n = m = 4, p-value = 0.1489). When 
communication is allowed but communication groups are not linked with output-sharing 
groups (Treatment FRNL), the mean individual session payoffs are neither significantly 
different from Treatment F (Mann-Whitney test, n = m = 4, p-value = 0.1489), nor from 
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Treatment R (Mann-Whitney test, n = m = 4, p-value = 0.5637). When the linkage 
between communication and output sharing is established (Treatments FFL and RRL), 
the mean individual session payoffs are lower than and significantly different from 
corresponding Treatments F and R, as well as Treatment FRNL (Mann-Whitney tests, for 
comparisons of Treatments FFL and F, Treatments RRL and R, Treatments FFL and 
FRNL and Treatments RRL and FRNL yield identical results: n = m = 4, p-value = 
0.0209). The mean individual session payoffs in FFL are significantly less than in RRL 
(Mann-Whitney test, n=m=4, p-value = 0.0209). 
 
5. CONTENT ANALYSIS AND EFFORT  
We have found that allowing non-binding communication increases effort when 
communication and output-sharing groups are linked and especially when the 
composition of the groups is fixed.  We now investigate how communication is shaped 
by the rules for linking and remixing the output-sharing groups, hoping to discover the 
forms of communication that are most effective in coordinating behavior. To do this we 
conduct a detailed analysis of the content of the chat messages.  
 
5.1. Coding the messages 
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Following Zhang [22] we organized the chat transcripts into coded-message units.
12 
After examining a small sub-sample of messages we identified the 14 non-exclusive 
categories listed in Table 5.  Two coders who were not otherwise involved in the analysis 
of the data from this experiment independently coded all messages according to the 14 
categories.
 13
 Each message can be coded under as many or few categories as the coders 
deem appropriate.  
Table 5 summarizes the relative frequency of coded-message units by category along 
with Cohen‟s Kappa statistic.14 All of the measured Kappas are significantly greater than 
0. Only three of the 42 Kappa estimates for Categories 4, 9, and 10 in Treatment FRNL 
indicate less than moderate agreement.  Messages in these categories occurred with very 
low frequencies (2.1%, 1.83%, and 0.94% of messages sent). We have no conjecture for 
why these categories exhibited such low agreement in this particular treatment (the mean 
Kappa exceeds 0.55 for these same three categories in both Treatments RRL and FFL). 
  
5.2 Volume of Messages by Category and Treatment  
                                                          
12
 
A coded-message unit consists of the information submitted by a participant to the other members of the 
participant‟s group during one communication sequence. A sequence starts when the participant begins 
typing a message and ends when the participant hits the “enter” button on the keyboard to submit the 
message to the group. 
13
 
A variable for each category records whether any specific message-unit has been classified to that 
category. A message is coded as 1 in any given category if it is deemed to fit into that category and 0 
otherwise.  If the two coders disagree on classification to a specific category, the corresponding variable is 
coded as one-half. 
14
 
The Kappa statistic measures the degree of agreement between two coders above that expected by 
chance. It has a maximum value of 1 when agreement is perfect, 0 when agreement is no better than by 
chance and it takes negative values when agreement is less than by chance. The general conventions 
regarding the interpretation of other values are as follows: 0 < K ≤ 0.20 is poor agreement, 0.20 < K ≤ 
0.40 is fair agreement, 0.40 < K ≤ 0.60 is moderate agreement, 0.60 < K ≤ 0.80 is good agreement and K 
> 0.80 is very good agreement [15]. 
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The volume of messages is clearly different across treatments. Treatment RRL  
(linked groups with random reassignment) has most messages (3218), Treatment FFL has 
fewer (2752) and the unlinked Treatment FRNL has the fewest messages (1808). These 
differences are highly significant (χ2 = 398, df = 2, p< .001) and are consistent with the 
nature of the communication regimes. In Treatment RRL agreements must be 
renegotiated with a new group each period. Fewer messages are required in Treatment 
FFL because agreements can be carried over relatively easily from period to period. 
Treatment FRNL prevents subjects from communicating with their specific output-
sharing group. Consequently communication may have been viewed as futile.  
There are interesting variations by treatment in the distribution of messages across 
categories. Table 5 reports and Figure 4 illustrates these distributions. Categories 3, 5 and 
7 are the top three categories to which messages are coded for each of the three 
treatments. Category 3 “Propose an amount to invest in market 2” is the modal category 
for Treatments FFL (29%) and RRL (32%) and second most frequently coded category 
for FRNL (21%). Category 7 “Talk about the investment decisions or payoffs made in the 
previous rounds” is the modal category for Treatment FRNL (27%). This is the third 
most frequently coded category for Treatments FFL (16%) and RRL (11%). Category 3 
“Agreement” is the second most coded category for all three treatments and varies from 
21% to 23% (not very different across treatments). 
Categories 2 and 8 “Ask/inquire/clarify proposals of other group members” and “Talk 
about the conflict/competition/coordination” are the fourth and fifth most often coded 
messages.  The former exceeds 10% only for Treatment RRL (10.4%) and the latter 
exceeds 10% only for Treatment FFL (12.8%).  None of the other categories are 
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associated with more than 9% of the messages (the largest is Category 13 “Others” which 
is recorded 8.8% of the time). 
      Discussion frequently focuses on proposals to coordinate effort to appropriation when 
communication groups and output-sharing groups are linked. When these groups are not 
linked, these messages occur less often, most likely because they cannot be directed to 
output sharing group members, and discussion focusing on experiences from previous 
rounds takes up more of the chat time.   
 
5.3 Aggregate Volume of Messages and Effort 
We now investigate whether there is any systematic relationship between the 
aggregate number of messages in a period and the amount of effort expended on 
appropriating the common pool resource in that period. We investigate the relationship 
between effort and specific categories of messages in the next section. We investigate 
both simple correlations between chat messages and effort and regression models which 
control for changes in message activity over time.  
The relationship between the chat variables and individual effort within the group is 
probably bi-directional. That is, the number and content of chat messages may influence 
the level of group effort and also the level of group effort may influence the number and 
content of messages in later periods. This is most likely to be true when the composition 
of communication groups is fixed across periods.  To avoid this issue of causality we first 
examine the simple correlations between individual effort per period and the total number 
of messages. We adopt the Kendall Tau Rank Correlation coefficient, which is a non-
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parametric measure of association between observations on two variables. This 
coefficient is computed by classifying every possible pair of observations as concordant 
(ranked the same on both variables) or discordant (ranked differently on the two different 
variables) and expressing the difference as a fraction of the total number of pairs. A value 
of 1 implies that every pair of observations is concordant, -1 implies that every pair is 
discordant, and 0 implies that half the observations are discordant and half concordant.
15
 
The Kendall Tau correlation coefficients and associated p-values are presented in the first 
row of Table 6. 
Table 6 shows immediately that the total number of messages seen by an individual is 
not significantly correlated with effort in any treatment. This is not the entire story, 
however, because both the overall volume of messages and their relation to effort may be 
changing over the course of the session. To address this we estimate the linear regression 
model reported in Table 7. This model interacts a trend variable (inverse period) with 
aggregate message volume. Overall there is a highly significant positive relationship 
between the volume of messages and the level of individual effort, suggesting that 
coordination is indeed promoted by communication. There is a very interesting negative 
interaction between volume and inverse period, especially for the fixed communication 
group Treatments FFL and FRNL. This negative interaction outweighs the positive main 
effect of volume, so that the estimated relationship between total volume and message 
volume is negative in Period 1 for both Treatments FFL and FRNL. By Period 2, 
however, the estimated relationship is clearly positive for both Treatments. We conclude 
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The quantity (1 + tau)/(1 – tau) is the odds ratio (probability of concordance)/(probability of 
discordance). 
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that early in the session high message counts indicate a group which is having a hard time 
coming to an agreement, while later in the session a high message count is associated 
with maintaining the coordination that has already been achieved.  
Result 5.  In general there is a strong positive relationship between the total volume 
of messages and the level of appropriation effort. However the 
relationship is negative in Period 1 for Treatments with fixed 
communication groups. 
 
5.4 Specific Categories and Effort 
Tables 6 and 7 also report on the relationship between effort and messages in specific 
categories. The Kendall tau coefficients for Treatment FFL show that individual effort is 
significantly and negatively correlated with the volume of messages in Categories 1, 2, 7, 
10, 11 and 12 (messages focusing on initiating discussion, clarification of proposals, 
effort and payoffs in previous rounds and negative talk about the group). Effort is 
significantly and positively correlated with Categories 9 and 14 (messages focusing on 
positive talk about the group and noting the last round). There are no other significant 
correlations. While correlations with most of these categories may be subject to reverse 
causation in fixed groups (i.e. previous effort affecting messages), it is likely that 
messages asking group members to clarify their proposals (Category 2) are associated 
with poor group coordination and likely the cause of significantly reduced effort levels.  
Simple correlations in Treatment RRL are less likely to be the result of reverse 
causation than those in Treatments FFL because the groups are remixed each period. 
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Consequently the actions in previous periods have no direct relevance to the groups in the 
current period. There are only three significant simple correlations. Individual effort is 
positively correlated with talk about previous rounds and positive talk about the group 
(Categories 7 and 9) but is negatively correlated with talk of luck or random play 
(Category 12). In Treatment FRNL only message Category 13 (other miscellaneous 
messages) is significantly correlated with individual effort. 
 As with total volume, the effects of individual categories of messages may be 
masked by within-session trends in the volume of messages. To investigate this effect we 
report in Table 8 estimated coefficients for a random effects panel model regressing 
individual effort levels on communication message categories in each period for each of 
the three communication treatments. The estimation assumes random effects at the 
subject level to account for correlation among effort decisions made by each subject and 
uses robust standard errors to correct for possible heteroskedasticity across subjects. The 
assumption of random-effects at the individual level fits the experimental context well, 
for any subject-specific effects (individual heterogeneity) are independent of changes in 
the experimental treatments (exogenous regressors). In addition to the message category 
variables in the model we include a trend variable (inverse period) and lagged variables 
for the total effort of others in the same group and total effort of others in other groups. 
These lagged variables allow us to control for the impact of past decisions of others 
within and outside of output-sharing groups in different communication environments. 
Note that these regressions necessarily omit the first period.  
Table 8 shows that the trend variable is not significant in any treatment. The lagged 
variables are significant only in the FFL treatment. This is as expected since in both other 
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treatments output-sharing groups were remixed each period. Rational subjects would not 
be expected to respond to decisions made in previous groups under such conditions. In 
the FFL treatment individual effort is positively related to the past contributions by others 
in the same group but negatively related to past contributions made by others in different 
groups. This suggests that, independent of the communication content, subjects raise their 
own effort levels when others in the group raise theirs (consistent with a tit-for-tat or 
reciprocity strategy) but respond by lowering effort if other groups are raising theirs. The 
latter is a best response strategy when groups are already contributing more than the 
socially efficient effort level, which is the case for the FFL treatment.  
The effect of different types of message varies by treatment. Messages directly 
associated with negotiation of effort levels (Category 3 – Proposals – and Category 2 – 
Clarifications) are strongly significant in the fixed, linked group Treatment FFL but not 
in the others. Note that the partial effect of clarification is negative. Frequent proposals 
will not increase effort if the other subjects are questioning them. Messages signifying 
agreement with a proposal were positively and significantly associated with effort in both 
the linked Treatments (FFL and RRL) but not in the unlinked Treatment (FRNL). 
Messages associated with group spirit (Category 9) and discussion about previous 
decisions and strategy (Categories 7, 8) are positively associated with effort in Treatment 
RRL, while talk about the game rules (Category 11) is negatively related to effort.  These 
categories are not significant in any of the other treatments. In Treatment FRNL none of 
the message categories was found to be significant at a 5% level.  
Result 6  The effect of specific messages on coordination of individual effort varies 
across treatments. In Treatment FFL messages related to negotiation of 
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proposals are most effective. In Treatment RRL messages related to 
strategy and group identity are most effective in raising effort. In 
Treatment FRNL no messages are effective in raising effort. 
To summarize, our content analysis shows that the rules regarding communication 
protocol have a powerful effect on the nature of the communication and its effectiveness 
in coordinating group behavior. Treatment FFL allowed the most successful coordination. 
Because groups were fixed the results of negotiation could be carried across periods, so 
fewer messages were needed than in the second most coordinated treatment, RRL. 
Because group identity was known and formed, messages in Treatment FFL could focus 
on specific proposals for effort and signaling agreement with these proposals. In this 
treatment there is a clear positive association between specific proposals and greater 
coordination (signaled in this experiment by higher individual effort levels).  
Treatment RRL allowed the second most coordination. Because groups were remixed 
every period, group agreements had to be renegotiated every period. This led to a high 
total volume of messages. Discussion of specific proposals dominated the communication 
in this treatment, to an even greater extent than in Treatment FFL. It is fascinating to 
note, however, that under these conditions a high frequency of proposals and agreement 
was not sufficient to guarantee higher coordination. Instead, messages related to game 
rules, strategy and group identity were most clearly associated with increased effort. 
Although their relative frequency was no greater than in Treatment FFL, these messages 
appear to have played a major role in creating a sense of group identity in Treatment 
RRL.  
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Treatment FRNL exhibited the lowest efforts, least coordination, and least 
communication. Discussion in this treatment shifted away from specific proposals, which 
were irrelevant when the communication group was not linked to the output-sharing 
group, and focused more on what had happened in previous rounds. Such discussion was 
not effective in promoting coordination in the output-sharing groups. 
 
6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
We have investigated the effect of alternative structures for communication on the 
performance of output-sharing partnerships exploiting a common pool resource. Our 
group size was chosen so that within-group shirking incentives would precisely offset 
between-group over-harvesting incentives and the Nash equilibrium would be socially 
optimal. In our baseline, no-communication treatments, aggregate effort was not 
significantly different from this efficient Nash equilibrium. In our other treatments we 
found that non-binding within-group communication was sufficient to reduce the within-
group shirking incentive and to lead to an over-harvesting equilibrium provided 
communication groups were linked to output-sharing group. The effect was greatest when 
group communication remained constant over the experiment. When communication and 
output-sharing groups were not linked there was no significant effect of communication.  
The volume and content of messages are affected by the communication structure. 
Messages are most frequent when teams are linked but remixed every period. In general a 
high volume of messages is associated with a higher level of effort, but this is not true of 
early periods when communication groups are fixed. In this case high message volumes 
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may be an indicator of lack of coordination. When groups are linked and fixed, messages 
associated with direct negotiation of effort levels are significantly associated with high 
effort levels. When groups are linked but remixed each period messages related to 
identifying the group‟s interests and promoting group identity are significantly associated 
with higher effort levels.  
Our experiment is similar in spirit to that conducted by Sutter and Strassmair [21].  
Like us, Sutter and Strassmair study the effect of communication on a competition 
between teams, in their case between two teams of three members competing to win a 
tournament where the prize is a transfer from the team with lower effort to the team with 
higher effort.
16
 The prize introduces an incentive to increase effort beyond that which 
would maximize the team's profit. This is similar to the over-harvesting incentive in our 
CPR. As in our experiment, there is a free-riding incentive operating within the team 
which tends to reduce the team's effort. Unlike us, Sutter and Strassmair treat increases in 
effort as beneficial. Our finding that within-group communication reduces efficiency in 
the linked group treatments is consistent with Cason et al.‟s [4] findings in a weakest-link 
tournament game.
17
  
Like us, Sutter and Strassmair analyze the effect of varying communication protocols 
on aggregate effort and on the composition of messages. Their treatments are within-
group communication (present or absent) crossed with between-group communication 
(present or absent), always in a “partners” environment.  In contrast, we allow only 
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 Actually, the prize goes to the team with highest output, which depends on aggregate effort plus a 
random disturbance, but this complication can be ignored for our purposes. 
17
 Cason et al. [4] report that within-group communication not only leads to greater coordination and more 
aggressive competition, but also reduces efficiency significantly in a weakest-link tournament game.  
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within group communication but examine both “partners” and “strangers” treatments 
(FFL and RRL respectively). Our third communication treatment (FRNL) introduces 
some aspects of inter-group communication, however, because the communication group 
is separate from the output-sharing group.  
Sutter and Strassmair find that the difference between the lagged own group effort 
and lagged other-group effort is generally significant. We support this finding for 
partnered groups (Treatment FFL) but not for stranger groups (Treatment RRL). We 
confirm Sutter and Strassmair‟s observation that communication with people outside of 
one's own team does not affect individual behavior (Treatment FRNL), but in our case 
teams are strangers not partners when they communicate with people outside of their 
group. One would expect that strangers had a bit more of an incentive to influence others 
not in their groups through communication as one might be matched up with them later 
on in the experiment. We also found that our groups focused on very different 
communication topics. In Sutter‟s and Strassmair‟s experiment, groups were much more 
concerned about unequal efforts within their team and appeals to fairness. In none of our 
groups was equity a major discussion topic. This seems to suggest that communication 
contents and consequently behavior are influenced by the specific task and the 
information provided to subjects. Like Sutter and Strassmair, however, we observe major 
shifts in the composition of messages across the various categories in response to changes 
in treatment.  
More generally, we have contributed to the literature on communication and 
competition among teams by extending the domain of interest to include common pool 
resources. In addition, we have shown that the structure of communication – whether 
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production teams and communication groups are linked, for example – is critical to 
understanding the effects of communication in these environments. 
At the policy level, our results show that communication within output-sharing 
groups poses a real problem for this form of resource management. Communication 
within output-sharing groups is to be expected if the groups are based in small 
communities and group members are well-known to each other.  This problem could be 
tackled in two ways. First the size of the output-sharing groups could be increased 
beyond the optimal size for non-communicating groups. Schott et al. [19] have shown 
that effort significantly diminishes with group size; presumably the same is true for the 
effectiveness of cheap talk in preventing shirking incentives. A second strategy is to 
unlink communication and output-sharing groups by having an agent assign output-
sharing group membership randomly and anonymously, remixing the groups at regular 
intervals. Communication under these circumstances might actually be beneficial since 
we have shown that it significantly reduces income inequality without affecting 
efficiency. 
This paper has focused on the effects of within-group communication. Further 
research could usefully investigate the effect of allowing inter-group communication in 
the manner used by Sutter and Strassmair. Those authors found that inter-group 
communication significantly reduced the effects of the effort-inducing between-group 
competition. It would be interesting to see if communication among all groups would 
refocus interest on the interests of all participants at once, leading to reduced harvesting, 
or whether inter-group communication could be used strategically by members of an 
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output-sharing group to induce other groups to reduce their effort without reciprocal 
action by the first group.  
In the environment we have presented, an outside agency establishes output-sharing 
groups as a means to manage the CPR. A further extension of this work could examine 
the role of communication and output-sharing in an environment with endogenous group 
formation or in an environment with communication in which the appropriators are able 
to design and implement the control mechanism. Resource users could, for example, 
either vote on the optimal size of output-sharing groups or an outside mediator could 
simply suggest the optimal group size (as suggested by Heintzelman et al. [10]). Pre-play 
communication furthermore has been shown to induce subjects to pursue the payoff-
dominant strategy (see for example Cooper et al. [6]). Will output sharing prevail as a 
management mechanism in such a setting? Can the appropriators from a CPR reach an 
efficient allocation through communication and effort constraints approved by all 
appropriators? Will groups evolve with the correct group size for the effects different 
communication environments create and will there be a role for randomly assigned 
output-sharing groups in this environment? These research questions are relevant not 
only in the area of the provision of public goods and harvesting resources from a 
common pool, but also for competition in oligopolistic markets and the efficient supply 
of effort by teams in large corporations. 
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Figure 1. Mean system effort allocated to appropriation from the common pool 
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Figure 2.  Mean FFL Effort less Mean RRL Effort by Period and Inverse Time Trend Line 
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Figure 3.  Distribution of individual session payoffs by treatment 
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Figure 4.  Distribution of communication messages by treatment 
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Table 1.  Experimental Design 
  
Treatment # of Sessions Communication 
Group 
Assignment 
 
R 
 
 
4 
 
 
No 
 
 
Random 
 
 
F 
 
 
4 
 
 
No 
 
 
Fixed 
 
RRL 4 
 
Yes, linked to 
output-sharing group 
 
Random Communication Group Linked 
to Random Output Sharing Group 
FFL 4 
 
Yes, linked to 
output-sharing group 
 
Fixed Communication Group Linked to 
Fixed Output Sharing Group 
FRNL 4 
Yes, not linked to 
output-sharing group 
 
Fixed Communication Group not Linked 
to Random Output Sharing Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Mean system effort per session by treatment 
 
 
Treatment 
 
F R FRNL RRL FFL 
 
Predicted system effort 
 
156 
 
156 
 
 
156 
 
 
156-234 
 
 
234 
 
Mean system effort 
 
150.40 
(7.38) 
 
 
152.77 
(20.27) 
 
 
166.87 
(17.21) 
 
 
186.57 
(10.90) 
 
 
227.92 
(6.97) 
 
 
Notes: Standard deviations of the session means are in parentheses. The means and standard deviations 
are based upon four observations for each treatment. 
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Table 3. Mean individual cumulative payoffs and coefficients of variation of payoffs per session by 
treatment  
 
 
Treatment 
 
 
F 
 
R 
 
FRNL 
 
RRL 
 
FFL 
Mean individual session payoff 
in lab dollars 
4174.26 
(21.67) 
4147.10 
(33.99) 
4137.98 
(42.90) 
3989.53 
(61.51) 
3528.27 
(123.95) 
Mean coefficients of variation 0.09 
(0.03) 
0.05 
(0.01) 
0.03 
(0.01) 
0.06 
(0.01) 
0.13 
(0.02) 
 
Notes: Standard deviations of the session means are in parentheses. The means and standard deviations 
are based upon four observations for each treatment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.  OLS regressions on coefficient of variation 
 
Treatment 
Coefficient 
(robust standard errors) 
F -0.04** 
(0.02) 
R -0.08*** 
(0.01) 
FRNL -0.10*** 
(0.01) 
RRL -0.07*** 
(0.01) 
Constant 0.13*** 
(0.01) 
Observations 20 
R-squared 0.854 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses ; *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10%. 
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Table 5.  Reliability indexes and frequency of message coding by treatments 
 
  FRNL 
(1808 units) 
RRL 
(3218 units) 
FFL 
(2752 units) 
Code Category Description Kappa Relative 
frequency 
Kappa Relative 
frequency 
Kappa Relative 
frequency 
C1 Initiating discussion 0.97 
 
6.14 0.93 6.67 0.81 1.05 
C2 Ask for / inquire / clarify 
proposals of other group 
members 
0.57 8.63 0.62 10.35 0.56 9.34 
C3 Propose an amount to 
invest into market 2 
0.79 21.40 0.72 32.40 0.76 29.41 
C4 Disagreement or doubts 0.33 
 
2.10 0.55 4.20 0.48 1.72 
C5 Agreement 0.84 
 
20.77 0.77 21.24 0.79 23.28 
C6 Talk about the relationship 
between investment 
decision and payment 
0.46 6.78 0.58 6.76 0.52 4.35 
C7 Talk about the investment 
decisions or payoffs made 
in the previous rounds 
0.80 26.80 0.63 10.77 0.62 16.28 
C8 Talk about the 
conflict/competition/ 
coordination 
0.51 7.61 0.52 7.61 0.60 12.81 
C9 Positive talk about the 
group (e.g., team work and 
group spirit, loyalty, 
honesty, equity) 
0.26 1.83 0.52 5.59 0.62 6.53 
C10 Negative talk about the 
group (e.g., distrust, 
dishonesty, defection) 
0.11 0.94 0.63 6.91 0.56 4.64 
C11 Talk about the game rules 
(e.g., conversion rate, 
grouping; what can be 
revealed in the chat) 
0.63 6.91 0.45 8.45 0.44 6.17 
C12 Talk about luck or play 
random 
0.75 2.05 0.57 0.70 0.87 1.14 
C13 Others (e.g., humor, time, 
comments) 
0.47 7.44 0.61 7.27 0.57 8.77 
C14 Noting last round 0.59 0.75 0.83 0.45 0.55 0.86 
 
Notes: Relative frequency is the number of messages coded in a category divided by the total number of 
messages recorded in a treatment times 100. The sum of the relative frequency can be greater than 100 because 
some messages are assigned to several categories. Messages coded as Category 2 do not specifically refer to a 
contribution level. For each category, the p-value is less than 0.005 for the relevant Kappa. These p-values are 
the probabilities of incorrectly rejecting the null hypothesis that coder agreement is no better than chance. 
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Table 6.  Kendall Tau Correlation Coefficients: Individual Effort versus Number of Messages 
(probability of making an error by rejecting null that coefficient is equal to zero) 
 
 Treatment 
Message Type FFL RRL FRNL 
Total Messages -0.035 
(0.207) 
0.002 
(0.935) 
0.041 
(0.172) 
C1:Initiating discussion -0.071 * 
(0.023) 
0.042 
(0.168) 
0.005 
(0.868) 
C2:Ask for / inquire / clarify proposals of other group 
members 
-0.136 * 
(0.000) 
-0.055 
(0.058) 
0.023 
(0.452) 
C3:Propose an amount to invest into market 2 0.020 
(0.484) 
0.011 
(0.678) 
0.055 
(0.061) 
C4:Disagreement or doubts -0.057 
(0.065) 
-0.014 
(0.644) 
0.000 
(0.988) 
C5:Agreement 0.049 
(0.081) 
0.008 
(0.775) 
0.012 
(0.694) 
C6:Talk about the investment decision and payment 
relationship 
-0.028 
(0.350) 
0.027 
(0.369) 
0.050 
(0.102) 
C7:Talk about the investments or payoffs made 
previously 
-0.094 * 
(0.001) 
0.060 * 
(0.040) 
-0.003 
(0.913) 
C8:Talk about the conflict/competition/ coordination 0.052 
(0.075) 
0.014 
(0.642) 
-0.016 
(0.597) 
C9: Positive talk about the group 0.133 * 
(0.000) 
0.103 * 
(0.001) 
0.031 
(0.318) 
C10:Negative talk about the group -0.122 * 
(0.000) 
0.033 
(0.273) 
0.033 
(0.297) 
C11:Talk about the game rules -0.073 * 
(0.016) 
0.010 
(0.736) 
0.029 
(0.345) 
C12:Talk about luck or play random -0.120 * 
(0.000) 
-0.080 * 
(0.010) 
0.052 
(0.096) 
C13:Others -0.032 
(0.287) 
-0.017 
(0.567) 
0.062 * 
(0.043) 
C14:Noting last round 0.087 * 
(0.005) 
0.041 
(0.188) 
0.036 
(0.255) 
 
Notes: Kendall Tau statistics that are significantly different from zero at the 5% level are marked with 
an asterisk. 
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Table 7.  Effects of volume of messages on individual effort 
 
Dependent Variable: individual effort    
Independent Variables FFL RRL FRNL 
    
Inverse period 0.35 -0.73 3.87** 
 (2.64) (2.39) (1.95) 
Volume of messages 0.15*** 0.14*** 0.16*** 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Volume*inverse period -0.27*** -0.08 -0.25** 
 (0.10) (0.08) (0.10) 
Constant 17.86*** 13.54*** 12.28*** 
 (1.01) (1.08) (0.63) 
Observations 720 720 720 
Number of individual 48 48 48 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant 
at 10%. All models include a random effects error structure, with the individual subject effects. The 
volume of the message is the total messages that an individual sent and received from his own group in 
a given period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 45 
Table 8.  Effects of various types of messages on individual efforts 
 
Dependent Variable: Individual effort    
Independent Variables FFL RRL FRNL 
    
Inverse period -2.82 -2.07 1.84 
 (2.55) (3.23) (2.21) 
Lagged period total contribution from others in the same group 0.12*** -0.01 0.02 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Lagged period total contribution from others in other groups. -0.03** 0.01 0.01 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
C1:Initiating discussion 1.74 0.42 0.13 
 (2.58) (0.31) (0.28) 
C2:Ask for / inquire / clarify proposals of other group members  -0.61*** -0.15 -0.07 
 (0.17) (0.23) (0.19) 
C3:Propose an amount to invest into Market 2 0.22*** -0.08 0.19 
 (0.05) (0.11) (0.13) 
C4:Disagreement or doubts -0.52 0.09 -0.34 
  (0.53) (0.35) (0.42) 
C5:Agreement 0.20** 0.32** -0.03 
 (0.10) (0.13) (0.10) 
C6:Talk about the investment decision and payment relationship 0.17 0.07 0.49 
 (0.27) (0.32) (0.36) 
C7:Talk about the investments or payoffs made previously  0.18 0.38** 0.02 
 (0.13) (0.16) (0.10) 
C8:Talk about the conflict/competition/ coordination  -0.15 0.69*** -0.26 
 (0.14) (0.25) (0.26) 
C9: Positive talk about the group  -0.17 1.12*** 0.28 
  (0.22) (0.28) (0.58) 
C10:Negative talk about the group  -0.19 0.29 0.48 
  (0.30) (0.19) (0.90) 
C11:Talk about the game rules  0.30* -0.76*** 0.23 
 (0.17) (0.27) (0.18) 
C12:Talk about luck or play random -0.80 -0.53 0.64* 
 (0.53) (0.92) (0.38) 
C13:Others  -0.15 -0.39* 0.13 
 (0.16) (0.21) (0.19) 
C14:Noting last round 0.18 0.99 0.66 
 (0.69) (0.98) (0.60) 
Constant 16.99*** 11.74*** 11.41*** 
 (2.57) (2.06) (1.45) 
Observations 672 672 672 
Number of individuals 48 48 48 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%. 
All models include a random effects error structure, with the individual subject effects. Variables C1-C14 are the 
volume of group messages by coding categories, i.e. the total messages exchanged within a group that fall into a 
given category.  
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APPENDIX I 
 
1. Equilibrium for CPR Environment when Individuals in Groups Attempt to Maximize 
Individual Profits when Output Sharing is Used as a Management Instrument 
 
Total output as a function of “effort” of all individuals using the CPR ( X ) is 
 
20.09375-32.5= XXY . 
 
Individual Profit as a function of individual effort ( x ), the effort by members of the individual‟s group 
( gX ) and the effort by all individuals using the CPR ( X ) is 
 
Y
X
X
n
xπ
g1
+)-3.25(28= ,  
 
where n  is the number of people in the individual‟s group. If 1n  then xX g  . 
 
Differentiating π with respect to x  and setting this equal to zero yields 
 
0)(
1
09375.0
1
25.325.3  gXX
nn
. 
 
This reduces to  
09375.0
1
)25.35.32( nXX g  . 
 
There is an equation like this one for each member of each group. When the groups have more than one 
member, the equations for all of the members in any particular group are identical. This results in three 
unique equations of the form 
 
09375.0
)25.35.32( n
XX g
m  , 
 
 where m  is the group identifier. 
 
In the case of three four-person groups, there would be three equations with three unknowns, gX
1 , 
gX
2 , and gX
3 . The solution will be 
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4
1
09375.0
135.32


g
m X . 
 
The important result is that there is not a unique equilibrium quantity for the individual. The 
equilibrium condition requires that the sum of the contributions of the individuals in a group equals a 
unique value. There is a unique group Nash equilibrium allocation of effort to appropriation from the 
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common pool.  In this case, the unique group Nash equilibrium amount of effort is 52.  The system 
effort is 156. 
 
2. Equilibrium for CPR Environment when Individuals in Groups Attempt to Maximize Group 
Profits when Output Sharing is Used as a Management Instrument 
 
Individual Profit as a function of individual effort ( x ), the effort by members of the individual‟s group 
( gX ) and the effort by all individuals using the CPR ( X ) is 
 
Y
X
X
n
xπ
g1
+)-3.25(28= . 
 
Profit for the group is 
 
gggg XXXXnπ 09375.05.3225.328.253=  . 
 
Differentiating g  with respect to gX  and setting this equal to zero yields 
 
09375.0
25.29
 gXX . 
 
When there are twelve appropriators from the common pool and 4n , there are three output-sharing 
groups and gXx 3 , therefore 
 
78gX . 
 
The Nash equilibria in the situations described above result in the following values. The important 
result is that there is not a unique equilibrium quantity for the individual.  The equilibrium condition 
requires that the sum of the contributions of the individuals in a group equals a unique value.  There is 
a unique group Nash equilibrium allocation of effort to appropriation from the common pool.  In this 
case the unique group Nash equilibrium amount of effort is 78.  The system effort is 234. 
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APPENDIX II 
 
INSTRUCTIONS (Treatment FRNL) 
 
Introduction 
 
You are about to participate in a project about economic decision-making. You will be asked to make 
decisions about the investment of resources between two activities, which will be referred to as 
Markets 1 and 2. The amount of money you will earn in today‟s session will depend on your 
investment in Market 1 and the sum of your and others‟ investments in Market 2. Your earnings will be 
paid to you privately, in cash, at the end of the session. The money for this project is provided by 
several funding agencies. 
 
The Environment 
 
During this session you and 11 other people will have to make decisions to invest resources in two 
markets. You will participate in 18 decision rounds, called periods.  The first 3 periods will be for 
practice. The last 15 periods will determine your earnings at the end of the session.  
 
At the start of the first round the 12 participants in the session will be divided into 3 groups of 4 people. 
The distribution of people to groups is random and none of the participants will know who is in his or 
her group. After each of the 18 periods is over, we will scramble the membership of all the groups, so 
that everyone is playing in a new group every period. Your earnings will depend upon the investment 
decisions that you make, the investment decisions that the members of your group make, and the 
investment decisions that the members of the other groups make. Your earnings in each round will be 
reported to you in Laboratory Dollars (L$). These will be converted to Canadian Dollars (C$) at the 
end of the session using the relationship 0.0045×L$ = C$. 
 
The Markets 
 
At the beginning of each period you and each of the other participants will be given 28 tokens to invest. 
These tokens may be distributed in any way you wish between the two markets. Each period you will 
decide how many tokens to invest in Market 2. Whatever you do not invest in Market 2 will be 
automatically invested in Market 1.  
 
Each token you invest in Market 1 yields a fixed return of L$3.25. This return per token is independent 
of the amount you invest or others invest in Market 1. Your return from Market 2 depends on the total 
investment in this market by all participants in the session. 
 
Although you keep all of your return from Market 1, you and the rest of your group will pool your 
returns from Market 2 and share them equally. Thus your payoff from Market 1 equals your return from 
Market 1 and your payoff from Market 2 equals your share of your groups‟ returns from Market 2. 
Your total payoff for the period is the sum of your payoffs in the two markets.  
 
Numerical Example 
 
In today‟s session there will be 3 groups of 4 participants. Each participant will have an endowment of 
28 tokens to distribute between investments in Market 1 and Market 2. 
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Suppose you invest 11 tokens in Market 2. Assume that each of the other members of your group 
invests 19 tokens. Assume that each of the other participants (not in your group) invests 17 tokens in 
Market 2. Here is how your payoffs in Market 1 and Market 2 are calculated: 
 
You invest 11 tokens in Market 2, leaving 17 tokens to be invested in Market 1. 
 
The total investment in Market 2 by the other members of your group is 3×19 = 57 tokens. 
 
The total investment in Market 2 by the participants not in your group is 8×17 = 136 tokens. 
 
The total investment in Market 2 by all participants is 11 + 57 + 136 = 204 tokens. 
 
The Market 2 Total Return Table shows the total and average return per token for a number of values 
of total investment in Market 2. If 204 tokens are invested in Market 2 the total return will be 
L$2728.50. The average return per token is L$13.375.  
 
                                        
 
Your return from the 11 tokens you invested in Market 2 is L$13.375 ×11 = L$147.125. The total 
return from the 19 tokens invested by each of the other members of your group is L$13.375 ×19 = 
L$254.125. Therefore the total return to your group is L$909.50. Since you share this return equally, 
your total payoff from Market 2 is L$909.50/4 = L$227.375.   
 
The constant return in Market 1 is L$3.25 per token. Therefore the return from the 17 tokens you 
invested in Market 1 is 3.25×17 = L$55.25. 
 
Your total payoff from both markets combined is L$55.25 + L$227.38 = L$282.63. 
 
Each of your group partners total payoff, on the other hand, is L$227.38 + 9×L$3.25 = L$256.63. 
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To simplify these calculations, the computer will show you an abbreviated Payoff Table for Market 2 
and a Payoff Wizard which will calculate the exact payoff for any combination of your investment, the 
average investment by others that are in your group, and the average investment by others that are not 
in your group. The abbreviated Payoff Table will be similar to the Payoff Table for Market 2 shown 
below.  
 
  
 
The payoff based upon the numbers given in the previous section can be easily calculated from this 
Payoff Table. Since your group invested 11 + 57 = 68 tokens, the average investment by people in your 
group is 68/4 = 17 tokens. Locate the column headed “17”. Since the other participants not in your 
group each invested 17 on average, locate the row labeled “17”. The number at the intersection of these 
rows and columns (227.38) is your share of your group‟s return from Market 2. Adding L$55.25 (your 
payoff from Market 1) to this gives your total payoff of L$282.63.  
 
Practice Periods 
 
To let you learn more about the environment we are going to run 3 practice periods. The results from 
these periods will not contribute to your final earnings. If you have any questions during these 3 
periods, please raise your hand and we will answer them.  
 
After the 3 periods are over, we will scramble members of the groups and begin the 15 periods which 
contribute to your earnings. 
 
(Monitor starts the session) 
 
Please examine your computer screens. In the upper right hand frame you will find a Payoff Table like 
the one in your instructions. Locate the cell showing your Market 2 payoff if you invest 11 tokens, the 
others in your group invest 19 tokens and the people not in your group invest 17 tokens each. To find 
the cell you must calculate the average investment made by all of the members of your group (11 by 
you and 19 by each of the other 3 is 68 tokens; divided by 4 equals 17 tokens). Under these 
hypothetical conditions, your payoff from Market 2 would be L$227.38.  
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Please click on this cell. Now look at the Wizard at the upper left hand side of the screen.  Note that the 
numbers from the Payoff Table have been entered into the Wizard. Your investment is identified as 17 
tokens, the average investment of the others in your group is identified as 17 tokens, and the average 
investment of others not in your group is identified as 17 tokens. Note the displayed payoff from 
Market 2 is L$ 227.38 and your displayed Total Payoff is L$263.13. 
 
Now use the spin-edit box to change your investment to 11 tokens and the average investment by 
others in your group to 19 tokens. Note that your payoff from Market 2 has not changed, but your Total 
Payoff has increased to L$282.63. This total payoff is identical to the payoff you calculated in the 
previous example, in which your group average investment was 17, but you invested 11 tokens, while 
each of the others in your group invested 19 tokens. 
  
You can calculate the payoff for any other combinations of investments by altering the numbers in the 
spin edit box.  
 
You make your decision by filling in the form at the lower left of your screen. Notice that the spin-edit 
box on this form shows the last value you entered into the Wizard. You can accept this value or change 
it any way you please. After you have entered your desired investment decision, push the Press Here 
When Done button. 
 
We are now ready to start the practice sessions. Please make your decisions and submit them. 
 
(after results are shown) 
 
The computer screens are now showing the results of the period. When you are finished examining 
them, please press Done        
 
(after screens change) 
 
You are now ready to start the second practice period. Notice the results from last period are shown on 
the history page on the right hand side of your screen. Remember that the groups have all been 
scrambled and you will be in a new group every period. Please make your decisions and submit them 
as before. 
             
(after results are shown) 
 
The results of the second practice period are now being shown. Please examine them and then proceed 
to the third practice period. 
 
(after third period begins) 
 
This is the third and final practice period. Please make your decisions and submit them as before. When 
the results of the third session appear, do not press the Done until you have read the remaining 
instructions.  
 
(after the results appear) 
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Communication 
    
Prior to the first paid period, you will be able to send messages to other members in your group. 
Everyone in your group will see the messages you send. To see how, please click now on the 
messenger tab in the lower portion of your screen. The messenger window will open. Then click on the 
lower (white) part of the box and type “hello”. Please everyone type “hello” now. Then click the „Send‟ 
button, so that others in your group can read your message. If you look at the messenger window you 
will see how many seconds remain for exchanging messages. The messenger window will be active for 
four minutes before the first paid period. 
 
After the exchange of messages you will make investment decisions. Although you will make 
investment decision in a new group each period, the composition of your communication group is the 
same across all periods.
18
 More specifically, before making decisions, you will always be able to send 
messages to the same group as you communicate with in the first paid period.  
 
Prior to the second and third decision periods, this is set at three minutes. Prior to the fourth round this 
is set at two minutes and from the fifth through the fifteenth rounds, communication is limited to one 
minute. Now please switch to the main window by clicking on the background. 
 
Although we will record the messages your group sends to each other, only the people in your group 
will see them. In sending messages, you should follow two basic rules: (1) Be civil to one another and 
do not use profanities, and (2) Do not identify yourself in any manner. The communication channel is 
intended to discuss your choices and should be used that way. 
Please do not close any window at any time because that will cause delays and problems with the 
software. 
  
Paid Periods 
 
We are now about to begin the paid portion of the session. We will scramble the membership of all 
the groups so that your group will consist of a completely new set of 4 people in each of the next 
15 periods.  
 
If you have any questions, please ask them now. 
Please examine the results of the third practice period and press Done. When everyone has done this, 
the first paid period will begin automatically. Please continue to follow the computer prompts until the 
end of the session. 
 
                                                          
18
 
In Treatments RRL and FFL, the sentence in italic is removed. 
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APPENDIX III 
 
SCREEN SHOTS 
 
 
 
 
Figure III.1 Decision Screen 
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Figure III.2 Outcome Screen 
 
 
